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THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 
Over a century ago, Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes observed that "medi-
cine, professedly founded on observation, is as sensitive to outside influ-
ence, political, religious, philosophical, imaginative, as is the barometer 
to the atmospheric density." In theory, "it ought to go on its own 
straightforward inductive path," he continued, but in practice there exists 
"a closer relation between the Medical Sciences and the conditions of 
Society and the general thought of the time, than would at first be 
expected."1 Holmes's piercingly accurate insight has never been so 
broadly and energetically probed as it is in the encyclopedic work at 
hand. The Encyclopedia of Bioethics (EB)2 indeed goes well beyond 
medicine. The work is considerably more than an encyclopedia of medical 
ethics. The four volumes range over the ethics of human life with major 
exemplification in medical and health-related concerns. Mustered into 
this sweeping effort are philosophy, theology, history, anthropology, 
sociology, psychology, biology, and law. Traditional and modern problems 
of medical ethics are treated, such as artificial insemination, organ 
transplant, in vitro fertilization, contraception, mercy death, experimen-
tation on human and animal subjects, and abortion. But there is also 
concern with racism, sexism, nuclear deterrence, ecology, and the just 
distribution of goods and bads in the political processes of planet earth. 
In other words, EB is predicated on the assumption that medical prob-
lems are broader than medicine and that medical problems are often not 
soluble by merely medical means. For human life to survive and even 
thrive a little, it must meet practical and philosophical challenges that 
cannot be met by one discipline or one world view. For this reason, EB 
draws from and explores the major religious traditions, some classical 
ethical theories, and various problematics that the human mind has 
marshaled to interpret and enhance human terrestrial existence. The 
result is therefore broader than any specialization. Indeed, it is not an 
overstatement to say that all of those who are concerned with how the 
human mind comes to know moral truth—whether their interest be 
professional or lay—are in the debt of Warren T. Reich, who directed 
this remarkably successful venture. 
I 
The work was from the outset a good idea. Bioethics represents a 
confluence of human value concerns. The rush to bioethics (some 1500 
1
 The Writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Riverside edition, Vol. 9, Medical Essays 
1842-1882 (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1891) 177. 
2
 Editor in chief, Warren T. Reich. 4 vols. New York: Free Press; London: Collier 
Macmillan 1978. Pp. xxxix + 1933. $200. 
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significant items are published annually in this area in English alone) 
involves a revolutionary development in moral consciousness. The blind-
ing positivistic poisons are belatedly blowing out to sea. The term "value-
free science" ominously entered the philosophical vocabulary in the 
middle of the nineteenth century, while the Western world was drunk on 
the prospects of scientific genius. With it came what Eric Voegelin called 
"the positivistic conceit that only propositions concerning facts of the 
phenomenal world [are] 'objective,' while judgments concerning the right 
order of soul and society [are] 'subjective.' "3 Philosophy succumbed to 
this pollution by naively sanctioning the separation of fact and being 
from moral value. In some sorry instances, philosophers segregated 
morality from the realm of genuine knowledge or confined its business to 
linguistic dissection and to a narrow pursuit of notional clarity at the 
expense of wisdom, breadth, and depth. 
Life is tolerant of such errors only for a time. Eventually the distinctly 
moral problems rising up from the physical and social sciences pressed 
their way toward center stage, and the new enterprise of bioethics was 
upon us. To greet this development with an encyclopedia was both fitting 
and timely. 
An encyclopedic viewing of such a field should be more than an 
information retrieval service, and this one is. It is an event of theory, an 
enabling scholarly achievement which in many areas clarifies the "state 
of the question," raises presuppositional questions, and promotes an 
atmosphere of broad-based and critical analysis. EB is not an unqualified 
success; no encyclopedia has been or could be. So Promethean an effort 
is at times inevitably foiled in its noble pretentiousness. Yet the overall 
success of this work is nothing short of outstanding. 
Most importantly, and in a way that is paradigmatic for relating any 
particular discipline to ethics, EB meets its prime obligation by conduct-
ing a multileveled assault on the idea that human affairs are ever 
conducted in a value-free vacuum. This is done not just in the analysis of 
justice, rights, natural law, and other common categories of ethics. It is 
also woven into the treatment of particular concerns such as attitudes 
toward the future, paternalism, embodiment, intelligence testing, and 
cost-benefit analysis. As the embodiment article drives home convinc-
ingly, "every medical practice, no matter how trivial, is to begin with 
value-laden, which means that each one either explicitly or (most often) 
implicitly is expressive of some vision of what is or is thought to be 
morally good— The primary issue for bioethics.. .is to educe, to make 
explicit, the 'ways of construing the world' found in ongoing medical 
interventions and patient-responses." Medicine is called upon to acknowl-
3
 Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics (Chicago and London: University of Chicago, 
1952) 11. 
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edge the "incorporation of ethical notions in each of its practices, and the 
necessity of having to assess these in their own terms as such" (365). An 
encyclopedia of ethics and politics, for example, could take EB as an 
exemplification of the job to be done in analyzing explicit and implicit 
moral assumptions operating on supposedly neutral turf. 
EB is also laudable in that it does not opt for a chaste detachment 
from controversy nor does it eschew tough-minded judgment of debated 
issues. Thus, in its excellent treatment of racism and medicine, the 
encyclopedia cites the historical role of medicine in bolstering and elab-
orating racist attitudes. Medical scientists proffered theories of blacks as 
an inferior and disease-prone race and argued, to the joy of racist whites, 
that Negroes were a vanishing race. The article on racism and medicine 
goes on to name names, noting that all of this "was given further credence 
when the nation's leading life insurance companies, led by Prudential, all 
but refused to write policies for Negroes" (1406-7). Physicians also, under 
the banner of scientific objectivity, "hammered away at the black man's 
distaste for honest labor, fondness for alcohol, proclivity to crime and 
sexual vices, disregard for personal hygiene, ignorance of the laws of good 
nutrition, and total indifference to his own health" (1407). Medicine 
offered a view of blacks as "diseased, debilitated, and debauched," with 
only themselves to blame (ibid.). Blacks and poor people continue to 
supply a disproportionate share of the subjects used in experiments, and 
the article concludes with these two blunt assessments: "The vast major-
ity of physicians never regarded the race question as an ethical issue for 
medicine." "Most of the progress that has been made on the racial front 
in medicine to date has been in response to pressures from outside the 
profession" (1409). 
The article on racism and mental health is equally direct. It cites the 
tendency to use psychological theories and biased tests to prove racial 
inferiority. Specifically, it notes of the prestigious Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory that it "was standardized by using normal groups 
of white men and women—no blacks were included. The hint of racism 
is easily suggested inasmuch as the test has separate norms for males 
and females because of modal differences in their personalities, and yet 
modal differences are not unlike nor as great as those existing between 
blacks and whites" (1412). The article cites the "ludicrous proposition 
(held as true by many) that all blacks are, at least partially, mentally ill" 
(1411). EB does not subscribe to the prevalent view that objectivity 
requires a finessing of the unpleasant. 
EB stands as lucid proof of the impossibility of doing ethics in isolation 
from other disciplines. No two disciplines are created equal nor are any 
two disciplines identical in their intrinsic relatedness to other disciplines. 
Ethics, however, is unique in its natural ecumenism. Indeed, ethics is not 
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just one of the lot of disciplines. Discerning the moral, i.e., discerning 
that which befits and enhances the human, is a massive and complex 
enterprise, requiring input and collaboration from all who explore the 
various dimensions of the unfolding human mystery. Ideally, ethics in a 
university setting would not be a department or part of a department. 
Rather, it would be located in a center for the study of moral values 
where ethicists would offer the methodology for ethical inquiry and foster 
and formalize interdisciplinary evaluative collaboration among all de-
partments. Not by ethical theory alone is ethics done. 
EB illustrates this special nature of ethics in convincing ways. Take, 
for example, its excellent treatment of human sexuality. There are articles 
on sex therapy and sex research, empirical studies on sexual behavior, 
psychosexual development, the history of sexual ethics, and the question 
of sexual and gender identity. A reading of these articles and their rich 
bibliographical suggestions supports the contention that anyone attempt-
ing to theorize about the meaning of human sexuality, while ignoring the 
input of psychology, history, and empirical research, is poorly grounded. 
Nor should this approach seem alien or threatening to those long accus-
tomed to more deductive and unilateral approaches to the sexual phe-
nomenon. Catholics and others who have espoused the "procreative and 
unitive" rubric for understanding sex will find the conclusion of the sexual 
behavior article congenial: "The most important characteristic of sex may 
finally be that it is so deeply intertwined with affection and that it is still 
the chief human instrument for making progeny, and these may suggest 
some limits on its exercise, though they do not reveal the contents of 
those limits" (1568). Those who fear the demoralization of sex achieved 
by current hedonism will welcome the conclusion of the sexual-develop-
ment article: "Sexuality in human beings is so locked into forms of 
learning which are essential to moral development that it is inextricable 
from them"; and "sexual development is the ground for one of the central 
lines of moral development, namely the capacity for valuing another 
organism as a person" (1574). 
None of the disciplines that treat the human phenomenon may fruit-
fully dwell in "splendid isolation" from its peer disciplines. Arnold Toyn-
bee was certainly indulging in the elder statesman's prerogative for 
winking overstatement when he wrote: "The study of human affairs is, in 
truth, monolithic. The dissection of this mental monolith into the so-
called 'disciplines' is, at the best, a convenient operational device, while, 
at its worst—that is to say, if it is taken as being a reflexion of reality—it 
is a distortion of the truth."4 However, he was offering hyperbolic 
4
 Arnold J. Toynbee, Change and Habit: The Challenge of Our Time (New York and 
London: Oxford University, 1966) 89. 
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correction of the disciplinarily segmented approach to truth. Stripped of 
hegemonic claims, such as theology made in the past and the social 
sciences are prone to make today, the disciplines could all benefit from 
Toynbee's chiding and also from St. Paul's masterful epistemologica! 
insight that it is only "in part" that any of us knows. EB is a solid 
example of interdisciplinary co-operation. 
Another notable strength oîEB is its strong sense of the instructiveness 
of history, as exemplified in the 97,000-word entry on the history of 
medical ethics. This entry, which is a book unto itself, is fascinating 
reading and suggests both the relativity and the enduring meaning of 
some of the problems that consume medical ethics today. This entry 
moves from studies of primitive societies, through the Near and Middle 
East, Africa, south and east Asia, Europe, and the Americas. It is a feast 
of cross-cultural experience, aside from its specific focus on medical ethics 
and practice. 
Briefly and selectively, there are other strengths in EB. The treatment 
of abortion is balanced and is not the febrile issue in the encyclopedia 
that it is in contemporary debate in the United States. In this way EB 
fulfils its role in suggesting the proper significance of this serious issue. 
Also, the article on obligation and superobligation suggests a new per-
spective for the abortion debate. Avoiding the absolutist negation of any 
and all abortions regardless of circumstances and a bland and deceptive 
neutrality regarding the issue, this article suggests that at least in some 
cases "while abortion may not be prohibited by the strict sense of 
obligation, the better and higher way would consist in preserving and 
nurturing human life, with its potential and actual values, whenever 
feasible. In this way one could discourage recourse to abortion as much 
as possible without condemning those who choose to abort on reasonable 
grounds." It is suggested that in this way "the concept of superobligation 
promises a grace and poise to ethical reasoning that it would not otherwise 
have" (1152). Manifestly, the abortion debate could, among other things, 
do with more grace and poise. 
The articles on Roman Catholic directives in medical ethics and on 
Roman Catholicism both do well to include the traditional approach of 
probabilism. Probabilism grounded the legitimate pluralism of Catholic 
ethics, stating that there is freedom of conscience when there is genuine, 
not frivolous, doubt regarding rigorous moral absolutism. It is a system 
which should not be neglected, since it is a liberating and humanizing 
achievement of our Catholic theological forebears and has deep roots in 
the pneumatology of the Christian Scriptures and in the theology of the 
discernment of the Spirit. It is the necessary antidote, as EB notes, to 
such things as the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health 
Facilities issued by the U.S. Bishops, which ignores this rich Catholic 
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legacy and seems innocent of the very possibility of pluralism. It is also 
a necessary corrective today for the absolute tutiorism implicit in much 
of the oracular magisteriology which still abides at every level of the 
Church. 
Finally, EB counters two dangers that are inherent in the new area of 
bioethics: issue-hopping ethics and clubbing. Regarding issue-hopping, 
the primary role of the ethicist is at the level of theory and method. To 
be a person is to be an evaluator; to be an ethicist is to discern and 
explicitate the method proper to that evaluation. Moving from particular 
issue to particular issue without unpacking and elaborating one's method 
is imperfect service from an ethicist. The plethora of mind-teasing chal­
lenges in the area of bioethics has been a temptation for the hopping 
instinct of the ethicist. The diffuse concern of EB for methodological 
matters gives good example to bioethicists, who should show whence 
they come and what methodological presuppositions they carry with 
them. EB was well guided in this regard. 
Regarding clubbing, this is a too little recognized tendency in any field 
to indulge a grouping instinct, with consequent outgrouping of those who 
are not received. Involved in clubbing is the development of an orthodoxy, 
an unofficial but influential curia, even papal figures. The prime danger 
of clubbing in any discipline is the establishing of a false consensus and 
the banishing of creative dissent. It would seem almost impossible to find 
a field in which this phenomenon is not to some degree operative. New 
fields like bioethics and the centers that serve it and become sources of 
policy advice may too easily be prey to indentured bias. (The conservative 
attitude on in vitro fertilization in EB, and the near silence on psycho­
somatic and wholistic health, might signal biases in the United States 
bioethics club.) EB in its overall thrust, however, is not clubbish. It 
reaches out broadly and draws contributors from contradictory perspec­
tives. 
At the level of format and structure, Ε Β is exemplary. The bibliograph­
ical apparatus is excellent and often helpfully annotated. The indexing 
was well done and the print would be gentle even to aging eyes. The 
appendix of codes and statements related to medical ethics is highly 
useful. It includes general codes for the practice of medicine stretching 
from Hippocrates to the statement of the British Medical Association in 
1974, directives for human experimentation, the various patients' bills of 
rights, and the codes of specialty health-care associations. 
II 
Given the successes of EB> one laments any need for serious criticism, 
and yet some such criticism is justly due. I turn first to the twelve-article 
entry on ethics, obviously a central contribution to this work. The main 
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fear that grips creators of encyclopedias is the fear of premature obso-
leteness. In my judgment, this entry is the prime candidate in this 
encyclopedia for obsoleteness, since it is already obsolescent. The entry 
is top-heavily cast in the rationalistic and analytical mold that much 
moral philosophy, particularly of the British persuasion, has too long 
preferred. As a result, the entry drags us through debates and categories 
that should long since have been interred, were they not being prolonged 
on certain philosophical respirators. Someone going to EB for a formal 
look into ethics will come away from this entry with a notion of ethics as 
a tediously rationalistic undertaking. There we read: "Most contemporary 
ethical theorists agree that correct moral judgments are those that would 
be arrived at by impartial rational persons (sympathy is no longer 
regarded as necessary)" (439). In one example of this fleshless understand-
ing of reason, the valuing person "cannot use any fact about himself that 
distinguishes him from any other person." And "he must make his moral 
decision as if he knew nothing about the identity of the various 
parties involved" (440). In other words, we must strain to think of moral 
reasoning as stripped of affect and experiential immersion, huddled 
behind a "veil of ignorance," reaching for a mathematical abstractness in 
moral choice and judgment. In such a "rationality," which involves more 
of a gaming technique than an epistemology of ethics, there is no room 
for the mystical and the affective. There are no mystics behind the "veil 
of ignorance," only calculating, self-interested, rationalistic persons of 
"lean and hungry look." 
Moral knowledge is grounded in an appreciation of what persons are 
worth in all of their mysterious unfolding preciousness. However essential 
the service of practical and speculative reasoning in ethics—and essential 
indeed that service is—affection is still the animating mold of moral 
knowledge. The roots of moral knowledge are contemplative and tied to 
a faith experience of the value of persons. One would sense none of this 
in the pages of this entry. Here if one can make nothing coherent of 
Hume's "sympathy," or if one shrinks from emotivism and moral-sense 
simplisms, then affect has no epistemological credentials. The affective, 
mystical, and contemplative dimensions of moral experience and knowl-
edge must be left aside in the search for a detached and antiseptic 
rationality.5 Other traditions, certainly including the Thomistic tradition 
with its concept of "affective knowledge" of the good and the holy, have 
grappled with this perplexing but unavoidable dimension of moral knowl-
edge, but they are not represented in this major entry. Indeed, in this 
5
 For a fuller development of this than I can give here, see my The Moral Choice (New 
York: Garden City, 1978) chap. 3. I further develop this in "Ratio Practica and the 
Intellectualiste Fallacy," a Hoover Lecture given at the University of Chicago which, prior 
to its publication, I would make available to readers upon request. 
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entry, as in much of the literature of moral philosophy and Protestant 
theological ethics, one would suspect that if you have made reference to 
Thomas Aquinas and the natural law, you have paid adequate scholarly 
attention to the Catholic tradition of ethical epistemology. The age of 
"ecumenical ethics" has been all too prematurely proclaimed. 
Of the twelve articles in the Ethics entry, most are in the analytical 
tradition and spirit. Moore's Principia etìlica is the most frequent biblio-
graphical entry, and the confusing "naturalistic fallacy," about which not 
even Moore was clear, keeps bobbing before us. What truly would be lost 
if this confused category were commended to the archives of the history 
of ethics? What relief awaits moral philosophy if it could in a blessed 
kenosis concur with philosopher H. Girvetz when he writes: "That a book 
as barren of results as Moore's Principia could be regarded as one of the 
important works of this century is perhaps a measure of the desperate 
state of contemporary moral philosophy."6 
Teleology and deontology are taken as though they were inevitable 
and useful categories, though it is becoming increasingly apparent to 
many that they are no more successful than Sidgwick's trichotomy of 
intuitionism, egoism, and utilitarianism, which they were intended to 
replace. 
Another defect in this entry must be noted. The article on deontological 
theories speaks of "Hebrew-Christian ethics," "the Hebrew-Christian 
ideal," and "the Hebrew-Christian tradition" and "the Hebrew-Christian 
conception" regarding deontology. This is loose talk, since there is no 
such "Hebrew-Christian" amalgam with a single view of deontology in 
existence. It is difficult to think of any issue on which one could indis-
criminately lump Hebrew and Christian together as a supposed unitary 
viewpoint. The traditions are too rich and varied. The article offends 
further by alleging that this "Hebrew-Christian" view sees "the ideal life 
for man as obedience to the will of God, or to some positive law or rule 
believed to express that will, whatever may be the individual's own plans 
or desires," and that in "Hebrew-Christian" thought "the right thing for 
one to do is to submit to someone else's will" (413). This is a glaring 
inaccuracy concerning the nature of moral obligation in the Christian and 
Hebrew traditions. One winces at such a caricature when one thinks of 
the richness of the theologies of the reign of God, the imago Dei, the 
indicative and imperative dimensions of Christianly-conceived morality, 
the law of the Spirit, the nature of hesed and agape, the "theonomous 
conscience," and, in Aquinas' phrase, the Christian as a "participator in 
divine providence." Hebrews and Christians would recoil further from 
the unnuanced contention that the Kantian "stress on certain uberai 
6
 Harry K. Girvetz, Beyond Right and Wrong (New York: Free Press, 1973) 116. 
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values, such as autonomy, freedom, dignity, self-respect, and the respect 
for individual rights" is "incompatible ... with the Hebrew-Christian 
conception of the ideal life" (414). Such errors should not have slipped 
through the editorial dragnet. 
There are two special ironies in the orientation of this Ethics entry. 
First, medical ethics in this country was primarily developed by theolog-
ical ethicists, who were concerned with both the clarification of problems 
and their solutions, and yet the authors here are, overwhelmingly, moral 
philosophers of the analytical bent who are by trade less than concerned 
with solutions. Secondly, the current move away from this analytical 
approach is being stimulated, among other things, by the new interest in 
bioethics and by the new sense that the metaethicists are of very limited 
help in this area. 
There is another large problem in EB which is not the fault of this 
encyclopedia but of contemporary philosophical and theological ethics. 
This is the absence of a coherent theory of justice. This absence is indeed 
noted in EB: "If systematic judgments about the relative position of 
competing rights claims and duties can be made in any coherent and 
intelligent fashion, it is necessary to develop a coherent theory of justice. 
Such a theory has either not yet evolved or has not yet been recognized, 
nor do we propose to develop one here" (390). This, of course, is no minor 
disclaimer. Certainly, bioethics is concerned with nothing else than 
making systematic judgments about the relative position of competing 
claims and duties. The acknowledgment that the state of the art makes 
this impossible is a major embarrassment. EB could have served here by 
offering an extensive and multifaceted entry on the history and theory of 
justice. There is, indeed, an article on justice, and there are articles on 
rights and related matters. Also, justice questions abound throughout. 
Yet a fuller and more unified treatment of justice was indicated by the 
nature of the work. Justice is not just one virtue among many. It is rather 
the elementary and minimal articulation of what is due to persons and 
their environment. Justice is the prime business of bioethics. Well does 
Aristotle say that friends have no need of justice. For them, the higher, 
more generous dynamism of love supplies. But outside the intimacy of 
friendship (and most bioethical concerns are located outside that inti-
macy), justice is the bulwark against cruelty. Justice seeks the minimal 
due of persons and environment. A coherent theory of justice, therefore, 
is no luxury. Absent such a theory, theoretical and practical mischief 
inevitably reigns. Justice is the first fruit of the foundational moral 
experience of the value of persons and their environment. Thus any 
theory of rights is predicated on a theory of justice, which in turn is 
predicated upon a foundational anthropology. And in this is the rub. 
"Rights" is a big category in EB. It would be an interesting study to 
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discern how many anthropologies and moral presuppositions lurk beneath 
the varied uses of this term even in this work. 
Some of the authors in EB are quite mindful of the hazards of rights 
talk. "The indiscriminate use of the concept of 'right' to solve any and 
every moral problem" is cited (401). Also, "The proliferation of rights 
claims results in a weakening of the moral binding power of all rights 
language by sheer reiteration" (390). The relative newness of reliance on 
this usage is also mentioned: "It is only within the past three centuries 
that the emergence and general spread of the notion of rights has taken 
place" (1512). And yet the largest categorial item in ethics in the Index 
of EB is Rights. The hazards of rights language in EB and in current 
ethical, political, and legal discourse merit attentive scrutiny. 
First, it is necessary to recognize that the category of rights, as used in 
contemporary ethics, is an upper-level term reflecting several layers of 
presupposition, ideology, and theory. In American parlance the term 
frequently bodies forth a ruggedly individualistic and asocial ideology, a 
"me vs. you and them" viewpoint. Conversations conducted at the level 
of one rights claim vs. another are regularly superficial. In the abortion 
debate, the right-to-life faction and the right-to-choice faction do not 
even achieve intelligible disagreement. The proclaimed rights do not 
touch the foundations of the issue. The debate is frequently like that 
thirteenth-century conversation between the Mongol leader Kuyuk Khan 
and Pope Innocent IV. Mongol expansion was imperiling the Christian 
West. The Pope sent a message to the Mongol court demanding that they 
receive baptism and submit to papal authority. Kuyuk Khan was bewil-
dered. He replied that by the "virtue of God" all realms had been granted 
to his forces. It was the Pope, said the Khan, who should be submitting. 
"This, your request," said Kuyuk Khan, "we do not understand!"7 
In contemporary terms this altercation might be cast as a contest of 
rights, but this would indeed be superficial. It was not a tidy issue of who 
had the right to command whom. World views and religious, cultural, 
and anthropological assumptions were in contention. Rights talk would 
scarcely scratch the surface of this encounter. 
Similarly, debate on abortion fixated at the level of rights claims (as it 
is not fixated in EB) is but scratching the surface. Similarly, the right to 
death with dignity, the right to confidentiality, the right to know, the 
right to conduct low-risk medical experimentation on children, the right 
to limit freedom, the right to refuse blood transfusions or to insist on 
them are all proclamations that must be taken to their foundations. No 
two are the same nor will the argumentation for any two of them be 
identical. Implicit in much of rights language is a cryptic intuitionism. 
7
 See Voegelin, The New Science of Politics 56-58. 
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Rights tend to be proclaimed as self-evident truths, and the work of 
ethics to establish those rights is left undone. 
Secondly, rights talk easily leads to a one-rubric ethics. This is well 
illustrated in constitutional law. There a single right, the right to privacy, 
for example, becomes the short-cut solution for the most disparate moral 
problems. Under the privacy rubric, claims are made to a right to 
abortion, to contraception, to not wearing a helmet while motorcycling, 
and even to wearing one's hair as one chooses. In each case there is an 
enormous hidden agenda that is not addressed at all by the proclaimed 
right to privacy. 
Rights language, furthermore, introduces a bias for quantitative moral 
analysis, as though by a kind of weighing process one right could be seen 
to supersede another. This bias could at times lead to simplism and to 
the bypassing of the full methodic enterprise of ethics. 
Withal, rights talk is not therefore useless. A proclaimed right encap-
sulates a principle and often does so with particularly persuasive force. 
Rights can successfully state the claims of the individual in the face of 
the collectivity. They can also signal with emphasis new ideals and 
appreciations, such as the rights of the handicapped to meet their minimal 
needs, the rights of children to proper representation, and the rights of 
the aged to sexual expression. 
These comments, then, are offered as cautionary in view of the state of 
discourse in ethics and since EB is typically awash with rights talk. The 
Bioethics article, for example, finds the argument made "thoroughly and 
convincingly that natural objects (such as trees and streams) have rights 
to life and health" (123). Lest the inner logic of this, molded onto the 
juridical bias in American culture, lead to the establishment of Small 
Claims Courts for Bushes and Brooks, it might be time to cool our 
affection for rights as a moral factotum. Reverence for trees and streams 
is good and perilously belated. But it need not be believed that if that 
reverence is not translated into rights talk, it must perish from the face 
of the earth. There are other categories for the expression of moral 
evaluation. In the cause of categorial chastening, it is well to note the 
view of Chung Sho Lo, a professor of philosophy and former member of 
the UNESCO Commission, that there is no precise equivalent in Chinese 
for our word "right." There is, of course, in China's traditions an ethics 
of justice and mercy and gentleness.8 American ethical and political 
discourse need not be silenced if our usage of "rights" be duly disciplined 
and nuanced. 
Let these criticisms and cautions not obscure the main import of this 
review-article. EB is a sterling success. It should be on the shelf of all 
those whose interests or work lead them to moral value considerations. 
8
 See Josef Pieper, Justice (New York: Pantheon, 1955) 116 n. 15. 
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Also, a great circle is happily closing in EB. Science changed ethics by 
changing the sphere of symbols and images in which ethics was done. 
Rationality, critical thought, the appreciation of the prerogatives and 
powers of the human mind all were enhanced by science and had an 
impact on ethics. Now ethics is looking at science and awakening the 
scientist to the deeper dimensions of science as a human enterprise, 
conducted by and for humans on this good earth. 
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